You have heard this perhaps a million times: “Ukraine is losing…”; “Russia is gaining the upper hand…”; “Zelensky has no real arguments on and off the battlefield”. Don’t be confused — there is very little truth in any of those claims. They stem from bad and incompetent analyses, but they are also repeatedly pushed forward by the mighty Russian propaganda, the only branch of Putin’s empire that functions pretty well nowadays. If these easy-to-swallow propaganda pieces designed to plant the seeds of doubt in your mind are not in touch with reality, then what does the truth look like? What is the real situation on the frontline and away from it? What are the latest trends and tendencies in the art of modern warfare? How successful are both sides in implementing the newest technologies? How do the tactics evolve? I’ll try to answer all these questions below. And I promise to do this regularly from now on, writing short but informative analyses helping you to understand the dynamics of the Russian-Ukrainian war.

Drones changed everything (and still do)

During the early stages of the war, drones played only a marginal role in the efforts of both belligerents. They were quite large and easy to spot and were employed either as low-flying light bombers (carrying quite inadequate payloads) or as observers collecting and transmitting visual data to the intelligence departments and command headquarters (HQ). Everything changed literally overnight when, in early 2023, a certain someone on the Ukrainian side decided to stick an RPG grenade to a cheap FPV drone using regular duct tape and then crash it into a Russian target. The experiment, which, BTW, was not new because it had previously been used with good effect by various rebellious groups all over the world, worked surprisingly well. From that moment on, the drones used by both sides kept increasing not only in terms of quantity but also in their overall quality and variety. The latest news reports indicate that to a certain degree the drones even replaced the tactical air force and close-support helicopters. Currently, they can be divided into the following categories:

1. Drones operating over the line of contact. These are kamikaze drones, bomb-dropping drones, and observation drones (eye in the sky). They patrol literally over the heads of the combatants, searching for valuable targets and attacking them when requested.
2. Drones flying in operational depth, AKA “middle-strike” drones. They extend the so-called “kill zone” to at least 50 km and are used to predominantly target logistics (supply chains, moving vehicles, military stores, repair facilities, troop assembly areas, etc.). Pretty often they are accompanied by the so-called repeater drones that serve to transmit or relay the signal between the ground control station and the kamikaze drone meant to hit a target.
3. Long-range drones, AKA “deep-strike” drones. They are quite large, with a wingspan of several meters, and visually resemble small aircraft. Most importantly, they can carry quite significant payloads (50–100 kg warheads) over a distance of 1,000 km and even further. Both sides use them to render critical industrial assets such as oil refineries, port infrastructure, military-related plants, power stations, etc., inoperable.  They are usually launched in swarms in order to achieve maximum damage, as well as because many of them will be downed by air defense systems while flying to the target. One must keep in mind that most of the long-range drones are no longer "dumb." While in the past they used pre-programmed trajectories, at present they are controlled in real time by human operators or by AI-driven custom software.
4. Specialized drones. They are used for aerial reconnaissance, artillery fire correction, remote mining, dropping of supplies, and even for propaganda by spreading leaflets and transmitting audio messages through loudspeakers.

There is no sure way to stop a combat drone these days. The most proven method is to employ a multi-layer defense incorporating all means of anti-drone warfare: electronic drone jammers, mobile groups equipped with machine guns, self-propelled anti-aircraft guns, short-range surface-to-air missiles, piston-engine aircraft, fighter jets, and the latest invention, the drone interceptors, which are actually a special breed of drones designed to “kill” flying drones. In the combat zone, where the so-called “little sky” at any moment is literally infested with hundreds of FPV drones, the most effective method of reducing the threat is to locate and eliminate the enemy drone operators.

What are the odds against the overwhelming drone menace? There is only one rule—the closer the person is to the battlefield, the fewer their chances for survival.

Say goodbye to no man’s land

Because of the drones, no-man’s-land, the empty and very dangerous space between the two enemy positions, no longer exists in its classic sense. The fixed positions have vanished as well. They are replaced by the so-called “grey zone," a messy and shapeless strip of land, approximately 20 km deep, where the actual fighting occurs. The disappearance of the fixed positions causes a lot of chaos in the higher headquarters, since the commanders and staff officers are quite confused when it comes to pinpointing the exact whereabouts of friendly and enemy troops.

Disperse!

For the time being, the drones have put an end to yet another all-time classic — the massed attack. The constant threat from above has forced the commanders to split their troops into tiny groups, let’s say 2–5 soldiers. Even a platoon of 20 men is already a fat and juicy target worth hitting with artillery and everything else. What we witness nowadays is the rebirth of the so-called infiltration tactics, when two or three combatants, and sometimes even brave individuals, try to get as close as possible undetected to the enemy positions. An offensive is actually when many such small groups move forward simultaneously or in a coordinated manner. There is also another reason for dividing the combat forces into very small groups—the supply challenge caused by the drone dominance. Since the roads leading to the battlefield are under constant enemy surveillance, it is getting increasingly difficult to bring forward substantial quantities of ammunition, rations, fuel, and everything else, let alone to store them. Both sides try to overcome that by employing various means of transport, including the most modern ones like drone drops and remotely controlled unmanned ground vehicles, but all such efforts are rather a lottery than a permanent supply chain that one could rely on.

What about the trenches?

Trenches have been in use since times immemorial (they are perhaps the oldest type of field fortifications), but because of the drones (remember, trenches are open-topped!), they are no longer practical. On the other hand, many other types of fortifications, such as dugouts and bunkers, still matter, because they have some sort of roof. The same applies to houses and multi-story residential areas, let alone administrative buildings, public facilities, and industrial plants with their thick walls. This explains why the ancient concept of the fortress as a valuable stronghold is still not dead. The reason is always the same – it offers protection. Therefore, it is not a surprise that both sides are desperately fighting for the possession of every sizable settlement. But there is also another reason — towns and large villages can easily accommodate storage facilities, workshops, dressing stations, and evacuation centers and, therefore, can be quickly transformed into valuable logistic hubs.

The tanks: back to the basics

Tanks were born out of sheer necessity and desperation during WWI, when there was a quest for breaking the deadlock caused by positional warfare. In the following decades they gradually replaced the traditional cavalry as a concept and as a tool of maneuver. It wouldn’t be an exaggeration to say that WWII was concluded to a considerable extent by tanks used en masse in large mechanized formations. The latter also played a major role in the doctrines of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War. Tanks and other AFVs (armored fighting vehicles) were instrumental in crippling Saddam’s army and bringing down his regime during the Gulf Wars. The Russians tried to employ them in large numbers during the opening stage of the war in Ukraine; the Ukrainians, in turn, also used them (even though in smaller groups) during their successful 2022 autumn counteroffensives. But then the drones took over the sky above the Ukrainian battlefield and forced the opposing parties to dismantle the traditional concepts of conducting ground operations. It was learned the hard way that all large-scale armored attacks are doomed to fail, and the tanks again are being used as during WWI, i.e., as infantry-support vehicles. Their visual appearance has also changed — now they look like hedgehogs or caged objects because of the various steel rods, meshes, and other metal pieces welded to them to protect them from drones. Their most common employment is as long-range sniper platforms, precise self-propelled artillery, and hit-and-run armored support for the friendly infantry. Are the tanks dead as a concept and design? By no means, but their employment under new realities requires more careful planning, proper reconnaissance, and even closer cooperation with other arms and services.

The air forces: Are there any?

One of the most surprising side effects of the stalemate in the Russo-Ukrainian war is the very limited use of the air forces of both belligerents. There are several reasons for that: modern combat jet aircraft are very expensive and very time-consuming to produce; it takes nearly a decade to train a pilot and turn a rookie into a confident flying warrior; both parties have a rather limited number of planes and do everything possible to preserve them. Above all, the two post-Soviet countries are pretty well prepared and skilled in maneuvering and deploying in depth their considerable anti-aircraft resources. That’s why the current use of combat aircraft in the war in Ukraine is limited to just two tasks: shooting down deep-strike drones and launching guided bombs at enemy positions from afar. The Russians also use their strategic air force (the huge bombers designed during the Cold War to carry nuclear weapons and fly them over great distances) in exactly the same manner — as launching platforms for their missiles aimed at Ukrainian cities and their public infrastructure.

The current situation on the frontline

Now the time has come to answer the big question: What is the current situation on the frontline and where is the war heading? As during the previous three years, in most sectors it is the Russians who are attacking and have the initiative. Their advance, however, is very slow (and in some areas they can’t advance at all), and their territorial gains are very limited. Not surprisingly, both sides are desperately trying to justify their own actions and prevent enemy movements with the help of drones. As mentioned above, the actual combat is split into a countless number of small-scale actions supported by a handful of tanks and other armored vehicles.

The biggest challenge that both parties have faced recently is how to move as quickly as possible through the very extended “kill zone” (the former no-man’s land). The Russians, who apparently suffer from a shortage of armored vehicles, try to sneak through it using everything with wheels, including civilian vans and ATVs (quad bikes). Not surprisingly, in most cases this leads to enormous losses because of the lack of armored protection. In the last couple of weeks in several sectors the Russians also switched back to their old tactics of moving forward in big convoys (2–3 tanks, 10 or so other AFVs, and dozens of soft-skinned vehicles and ATVs). This also proved unsuccessful for them. Ukrainians, in contrast, use MRAPs (Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles) or AFVs in small groups (up to five) to bring forward their infantry, and for the time being this works well for them. Even though quite often the troop-carrying vehicles become victims of precise drone strikes, their design, centered around the survivability of the men inside the compartment, allows them to land the troops safely at the final destination point.

In general, the Russians keep pushing on a very broad front, with their main point of effort being the remnants of the Donetsk Oblast (Donbas) still in Ukrainian hands. They will keep doing that, driven by simple political and propaganda purposes, aimed at both domestic and foreign public opinion. On the one hand, Moscow needs to strengthen the ranks of the die-hard warmongers and regime supporters at home (the so-called Z-community) and convince them that the Special Military Operation still proceeds as planned. On the other hand, Putin and his entourage firmly believe that every new square kilometer of ground they gain in Ukraine (regardless of the cost in human lives and materiel) is instrumental in shaking the morale of the international supporters of Kyiv, be they part of the ruling elite or ordinary citizens of the democratic world.

To prevent the Russians from achieving a decisive breakthrough somewhere on the front line during the coming months, the Ukrainian army must hold several key points and their surrounding areas. Let’s review them all, going from the northeast to the southwest.

In the northeast, the Ukrainians must defend at any cost the ruins in the southern part of the small town of Vovchansk, thereby stopping the invaders from advancing towards Kharkiv. They also must consolidate their positions in the vicinity of the recently liberated Kupiansk and, by doing so, set up a wide defensive salient in the northeast of Kharkiv Oblast.

Further south, it is critical to keep the Russians at bay along the Liman–Chasiv Yar line. This will allow the Ukrainian army to prevent them from advancing westwards and getting closer to Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, the biggest settlements in Donbas still in Ukrainian hands. For the time being, the approaches to Sloviansk and Kramatorsk from the southeast are well protected by Kostiantynivka (a town with a prewar population of 50,000), which is already in the “gray” zone because fighting is ongoing in its southern limits.

There is no doubt that the Ukrainians will do their best to contain the Russians immediately to the north of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, which they recently abandoned after many months of brutal urban fighting. Holding that position is of critical importance, because now a vast, empty, and flat land lies ahead of the Russian spearheads on their way to Pavlohrad, the next big city situated some 100 km to the northwest. Save for some villages, there are no large settlements that could be used as fortresses and strongholds by the Ukrainians.

Beginning in mid-February, the Ukrainian army launched a series of small-scale counterattacks along the 100 km line stretching from Pokrovsk to Huliaipole and, in some sectors, succeeded in advancing up to 20 km forward. These counterattacks are ongoing, and it is difficult to say for how long they will continue. The Ukrainian leadership is reluctant to call it a full-blooded counteroffensive, but its operational and psychological effect is similar. To a considerable degree, they are successful because of the implementation of the infiltration tactics described above (small mobile groups moving quickly through the “kill zone” on MRAPs and AFVs).

The decision of Elon Musk to shut down all Starlink portable internet terminals used by the Russians on Ukrainian territory also played its part, as it totally ruined their battlefield communications and caused havoc in the chain of command.

Further west, the Ukrainians are doing everything humanly possible to prevent the Russians from getting nearer to the key city of Zaporizhzhia (pre-war population of 700,000) by fiercely defending two important advance positions built around the towns of Orikhiv (in the southeast) and Stepnohirsk (in the south). Especially in the area of the latter, they employ active defense, repeatedly counterattacking the invaders in order to break the momentum of the enemy offensive.

 

Military expert

Kamen NEVENKIN

#RUSSIA

#UKRAINE

27.03.2026 06:19