Introduction

On June 7, 2026, Armenia will hold its next parliamentary elections, which, like previous ones, are taking place amid acute domestic political tension. This tension is further aggravated by widespread public disillusionment, the absence of a clear political agenda, and the near-total lack of meaningful dialogue between society and the political class. The events of 2020 and 2023 led to a deep security crisis that continues to exert pressure on the country’s internal political life.

In this context, many domestic and international analysts portray the 2026 elections as a decisive event that will supposedly determine Armenia’s foreign policy course. In pro-Western circles, there is a widespread view that the outcome will show whether Armenia will continue strengthening its Western orientation or return to a close alliance with Russia. More radical assessments suggest that in the event of an opposition victory, Armenia would abandon the Trans-Caspian International Transport Corridor (TRIPP), attempt to integrate into the “Russian world”, minimize relations with the West, and seek to resolve Armenian-Azerbaijani relations under Moscow’s patronage — potentially leading to a new escalation or even war. Some extreme positions even entertain the possibility of Armenia integrating with Russia at the level of a Union State, following the Belarusian model, citing statements by Robert Kocharyan, Gyumri Mayor Vardan Ghukasyan, and other opposition figures who have expressed sympathy toward Russia and criticized deeper engagement with the West.

On the other hand, the opposition’s anti-Western rhetoric is often justified by the need to “save Armenia from Turkification”. More radical supporters argue that distancing from Russia would automatically place Armenia under the influence of Turkey and Azerbaijan, as well as under the economic and political pressure of Turkish-Azerbaijani capital. In their view, TRIPP brings no real benefits to Armenia and effectively represents concessions to Azerbaijan under U.S. auspices.

In reality, such assessments are largely one-sided and propagandistic. The 2026 parliamentary elections do not carry the geopolitical weight of a “referendum” often attributed to them. First and foremost, they will serve as a test of domestic legitimacy, governance effectiveness, public sentiment, and the level of consensus around the peace process. Armenia’s foreign policy trajectory — rapprochement with the EU, cooperation with the West in the security sphere, and normalization with Azerbaijan — has already developed structural inertia since 2020 and was reinforced by the 2025 Washington Declaration. It is unlikely that this trajectory will be radically altered by the outcome of a single election.

Public Sentiment and Polling Data

On the eve of the elections, various polls present differing pictures of political support. On average, the ruling Civil Contract party of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan remains in the lead with approximately 24–29% support. It is followed by the “Strong Armenia” party of Samvel Karapetyan (9–11%), the Armenia bloc of Robert Kocharyan (around 5%), and Prosperous Armenia led by Gagik Tsarukyan (2–3%). The position of Serzh Sargsyan’s Republican Party remains uncertain.

Current data indicate the following:

1. IRI (February 2026): Civil Contract — 24-29%, Karapetyan — 9-11%, Kocharyan — 3-4%, undecided voters — up to 48%;
2. EVN Report / ArmES: Civil Contract — 26.1%, Strong Armenia — 11.9%;
3. HayVote (online): reflects protest sentiment but is not representative.

The key factor is the exceptionally high share of undecided voters (30–50%). This segment, characterized by deep dissatisfaction with both the government and the opposition, will be decisive.

Another important factor is the significant decline in trust toward Russia within Armenian society following the events of 2020–2023, including the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh and the perceived inaction of the CSTO. Harsh statements by Russian officials and state media have further intensified negative perceptions, weakening the position of pro-Russian forces.

Positions of the Government and the Opposition

The current situation largely works in favor of the ruling authorities. Despite a decline in approval ratings compared to 2021, the government maintains a relative advantage due to its active engagement with the West and its promotion of a peace agenda.

At the same time, the authorities face several vulnerabilities, including criticism for a perceived soft stance toward Azerbaijan, populist and emotional rhetoric, slow reforms and social dissatisfaction, and strained relations with the Armenian Church.

The opposition finds itself in a more difficult position. Its main challenges include the lack of a unified strategy, internal conflicts, and dependence on a pro-Russian narrative that is increasingly losing appeal. The emergence of Samvel Karapetyan has reinvigorated the political field, but his ties to Russia raise suspicions.

Moreover, the opposition has failed to present realistic solutions in the field of security. Promises of rapid economic growth and the “return of Artsakh” are met with skepticism by the public.

Impact of Regional Instability

The war between Iran and the United States/Israel, which began in February 2026, poses additional risks for Armenia. Potential consequences include disruptions in gas supplies, rising prices, logistical challenges, and an influx of refugees.

From a security perspective, there remains a risk of border destabilization, although no direct spillover has been observed so far.

Politically, the conflict increases public anxiety but is unlikely to fundamentally alter the election outcome. On the contrary, it may further weaken pro-Russian narratives, given Moscow’s limited role in supporting Iran.

Possible Scenarios

The most likely scenario is a victory for Civil Contract with approximately 35-45% of the vote and the potential formation of a coalition government.

An alternative scenario would involve a fragmented parliament and an attempt by the opposition to unite, similar to the Gyumri model. However, this would be difficult to achieve due to internal divisions.

The 2026 parliamentary elections in Armenia are primarily a domestic political test rather than a geopolitical turning point. The country’s foreign policy course has already been established and demonstrates considerable resilience.

Even amid regional instability and war in the Middle East, the key determining factor remains the quality of domestic governance. Under current conditions, the ruling authorities hold a more stable position, while the opposition faces serious structural constraints.

Nevertheless, the situation remains dynamic, and any forecasts may change under the influence of both internal and external factors.

Research Fellow,
Araik Mkrtumyan

#ARMENIA

17.03.2026 06:33