How do wars end? What exactly terminates the hostilities for good and brings a lasting peace?

There are two proven ways of ending armed conflicts: 1) an ultimate victory of one belligerent over another on the battlefield, and 2) a conscious decision made by a responsible head of state or a governing body. There are many examples of the former — for instance, both world wars. Sadly, there are scarcely any examples of the latter. Still, we can recall how Richard Nixon ended the direct U.S. military involvement in the Vietnam War by signing the Paris Peace Accords in January 1973; how Gorbachev pulled out the Soviet forces first from Afghanistan in 1989 and then from Eastern Europe in the early 1990s; and most recently, Biden's decision to withdraw the American troops from Afghanistan in April 2021. Putin, however, is unlike any of the leaders mentioned above. He can drag the current war on forever, citing justified reasons and blaming everyone around.

The struggle in Ukraine may seem endless, but there is always light at the end of the tunnel. First and foremost, there are some sure signs that the initiative on and off the battlefield is passing to the Ukrainians. Second, it is obvious that Russian society is growing war-weary. Third, Putin and the elites around him keep hinting at peace talks and possible economic cooperation with the so-called “unfriendly” countries. Fourth, the Russian High Command, Moscow’s state propaganda machine and even the dictator himself repeatedly resort to outrageous manipulation of the official information, threats to neighboring countries and the usual nuclear rhetoric. I could mention some more points supporting my thesis, but they will not change the big picture and the overall impression that nowadays Russia looks like a runaway train or a big plane with an empty cockpit whose path is controlled on autopilot.

During the last two weeks the situation on the frontline saw no significant changes and maybe this is good news for Ukraine. The long-anticipated Russian spring offensive failed to materialize simply because the current conditions on the battlefield don’t allow mass employment of large units in the classic sense of the word. Nowadays even the slightest movement is controlled by drones; they are also responsible for the largest share of casualties inflicted. All countermeasures taken against them are either ineffective or are of a temporary nature. Even though the drone menace works both ways, there are some statistics that clearly show that the Russian army has shot its bolt and already is running out of steam. One of them is the growing negative gap between the personnel losses and the number of men that arrive as replacements. Even though the difference is still not that big, if that tendency is not reversed in the immediate future, it may cause the aggressors serious troubles in the long run. Not surprisingly, many analysts predict a new wave of mass mobilization in Russia right after the parliamentary elections that are scheduled for September. I seriously doubt that such a forced measure will prove a remedy for the pending problems of Putin’s army since the barely motivated middle-aged men would hardly bring the desired change on the battlefield. There will simply be more targets for the Ukrainian artillery and drone operators.

For centuries Russian rulers have believed that their country is invincible because of the very large manpower pool their army could draw from. But that was such a long time ago. Now the realities are different. The very precise modern weapons have made the killing of a human being easier than ever. It is also cheaper than ever to do that. In World War II about 9,000 bullets were needed to put one enemy soldier out of action. Each of them had a production cost of nearly a dollar in today’s value. Currently, according to data provided by Robert “Madyar” Brovdi, the chief commander of the Ukrainian drone forces, it takes between two and three FPV drones at a total cost of up to USD 882 to completely eliminate a Russian soldier. By comparison, the production cost of one standard NATO 155-mm artillery shell starts from USD 2,500 and even the most skilled howitzer crew can’t guarantee a direct hit. The demographics are also different — a century ago the average Russian was a young adult with up to nine brothers and sisters, but today the typical average citizen of the Russian Federation is a 42-year-old single mother with one child. To put it simply, the seemingly endless waves of Russian men that could overwhelm any opponent by sheer weight of their numbers are no longer a war-winning factor.

Speaking of the frontline, there are two indicators that deserve our attention. The first one is the interesting fact that in the recent weeks the AFU (Armed Forces of Ukraine) have launched more attacks and counterattacks than before. This means that in many sectors the Ukrainians don’t rely on passive defense only but also are successfully regaining tactical initiative. By doing so, they interrupt the momentum of the Russian assaults and prevent the enemy infantry from advancing. Nevertheless, one has to keep in mind that the overall Russian activity along the frontline remains very high — the Ukrainian General Staff reported that on May 17 alone the Russian forces had mounted 234 ground attacks.

The second indicator is the amount of ground liberated by the AFU since the beginning of the year. The numbers vary, but the tendency to ruin the offensive efforts of Putin’s army by counterattacking it whenever and wherever it is possible is also clearly visible here. A very reputable source, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), states that the Russian forces suffered a net territorial loss of approximately 116 square kilometres in April 2026, marking Russia’s first month of net territorial decline since August 2024. Similar information is provided by President Zelensky and the commander-in-chief of the AFU, General Syrskyi, although their numbers differ slightly from those published by the ISW.

In the last two weeks the Ukrainian troops achieved their biggest success in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast, just to the north of the Sea of Azov. They launched sharp counterattacks immediately to the north and south of Huliaipole, threatening the ground communications in the vicinity of that very important logistic hub. The AFU also continue resolutely to defend the key village of Mala Tokmachka, which has gained huge worldwide popularity in the recent weeks due to the numerous failed attempts of the Russians to secure it by direct assaults. In case you still don’t know, Mala Tokmachka is not important per se, it covers the approaches to the town of Orikhiv, also a key fortress and a logistic hub, which in turn protects the city of Zaporizhzhia from the southeast. The AFU also succeeded in fully liberating the town of Stepnohirsk, which is situated some 45 km to the south of Zaporizhzhia, thereby pushing the aggressors even further away from the city.

The defensive success of the AFU in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast would hardly have been achieved without the regular strikes carried out by their drones on the Russian supply chain stretching from Crimea to Rostov. As a matter of fact, the Ukrainians succeeded in blocking the entire traffic on the main highways. In that regard they were considerably “helped” by the local civil administration and the Russian military command that issued orders banning the movement of all vehicles not involved in the transport of supplies for the army. By doing so, they actually told the AFU drone operators that every single truck moving on the road is carrying goods for the invaders. This instantly eliminated any need for careful target selection.

In the eastern sector of the front it was the Russians who launched most of the attacks. Still, the AFU succeeded in completely clearing the nearly demolished town of Kupiansk of the Russians who had been hiding in basements and deserted buildings since December. There are also ongoing Ukrainian counterattacks in the vicinity of Lyman that threaten to cut off the Russian spearhead trying to outflank the town from the north.

In the other sectors in the Donbas area the initiative belongs to the Russians. They are slowly but steadily grinding their way through the solid Ukrainian defensive belts built to the east of Sloviansk. It is the severe shortage of manpower in the frontline brigades of the AFU that prevents them from containing the Russian onslaught. I can safely say that for the time being the Sloviansk sector remains the most endangered one in the entire Ukrainian defense. Given the strategic and political value of the city, there is no doubt that the Russians will do everything humanly possible to take it already this year. The situation in Kostiantynivka is no less difficult, but due to the skillfully established defensive perimeter around the town, the Ukrainian 24th Brigade manages to hold out.

Strangely enough, it seems that until recently Russian society was paying very little (if any) attention to the situation on the battlefields in Ukraine. It was the massive drone strikes of the AFU against the refineries, the oil infrastructure and the military-related factories and facilities that shook the Russians to the core. It is difficult to say whether the series of precise hits have turned them into convinced pacifists, but apparently the vast majority of the citizens of the Russian Federation no longer dream of imposing the “Russian world” on Europe.

Military expert

Kamen Nevenkin

#ANALYSIS

#RUSSIA

#UKRAINE

25.05.2026 08:50