Negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan are increasingly becoming not only a foreign policy process but also an arena of intense domestic political competition. While the government of Nikol Pashinyan promotes a “realistic peace” agenda and has effectively launched its electoral campaign under the “peace” narrative, the opposition is constructing a systematic counter-discourse in which the key term is not “peace” but “imposed capitulation”, allegedly lacking real security guarantees.

Already 19 political forces have submitted documents to the Central Electoral Commission of Armenia, and their approaches to the peace process can be broadly divided into several categories. The ruling Civil Contract party and pro-Western forces support the rapid signing of a peace agreement, the opening of regional transport links, and normalization of relations with Azerbaijan. Opposition forces such as the pro-Russian “Hayastan” alliance and “I Have Honor” insist on a tougher line: prioritizing security, rejecting unilateral concessions, and ensuring binding guarantees for Armenians, including international monitoring mechanisms.

A number of parties and movements emphasize an international legal track — continuing cases in international courts, strengthening the role of external actors, and applying diplomatic pressure on Azerbaijan. There are also political forces advocating a more independent approach, cautious toward external mediation and focused on internal consolidation.

Additional tension was introduced by Justice Minister Srbuhi Galyan’s statement confirming that the draft of a new Constitution is already ready. This effectively moved constitutional reform from an abstract agenda into a practical phase with direct implications for negotiations with Baku. At the same time, the government has stated that a constitutional referendum is not planned this year.

Srbui Galyan: The new Constitution of Armenia is legally ready

Azerbaijan’s demand to amend the Armenian Constitution remains one of the main obstacles to a peace treaty. This includes the possible removal of references to the Declaration of Independence — a matter formally described in Yerevan as internal. However, in practice, the Constitution has already become part of the negotiation process. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has effectively acknowledged the possibility of discussing amendments, describing the previous formulation as a “logic of conflict”.

Thus, the peace treaty is no longer purely a diplomatic document — it is becoming an element of state transformation. The government’s argument is based on a strict logic: the alternative to peace is another war. Pashinyan has explicitly stated that “continuing the previous logic means a new escalation”. In this paradigm, compromise is seen as inevitable, the Constitution as an adaptation tool, and peace as a mechanism for stabilization.

The government promotes a pragmatic approach: the peace treaty is viewed as an instrument for security and economic development. Pashinyan’s position across various speeches reduces to the idea that “peace is a long-term security guarantee”, even if it requires difficult compromises.

Opposition forces offer the opposite interpretation. In this discourse, peace is seen not as security but as dependence and loss of sovereignty. The pro-Russian opposition leader and head of the “Hayastan” bloc, former President Robert Kocharyan, emphasizes a key point — guarantees: “Peace cannot depend on the goodwill of one person”. He insists that a sustainable agreement is only possible with international guarantors and describes the current process as “peace based on a gentleman’s agreement”.

In effect, the opposition shifts the debate to a different plane: not “whether to sign”, but “what kind of peace is being signed”. A separate line is promoted by Russian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan, who advocates the concept of “strong peace”: “Peace is not requested — it is maintained by strength”. His approach is based on three pillars: a strong army, pragmatic diplomacy, and economic independence.

Samvel Karapetyan – Candidate for the Position of Prime Minister of Armenia

Criticism of the peace agenda extends beyond traditional opposition. The “Hayakve” movement actively promotes the idea of protecting the “national agenda” and opposes constitutional changes that could affect the Declaration of Independence. Their rhetoric focuses on preserving identity, rejecting “historical revision”, and mobilizing society against concessions.

Differences in rhetoric are deepening polarization. The government speaks in terms of “borders”, “threats”, “institutions”, and “reforms”, while the opposition uses the language of “loss” and “national trauma”. This gap creates two parallel informational realities in which compromise becomes increasingly difficult.

Escalation Rhetoric: “Peace or a New War”

During the pre-election period, political discourse around the peace treaty increasingly takes the form of stark warnings. The Prime Minister directly links rejection of the current negotiation path with the risk of a new war. According to him, revising the peace agenda or the coming to power of forces opposing the agreement could lead to escalation comparable to the events of September 2022: “If we abandon this logic of peace or try to revise it, it may mean a new war, a new ‘September’”.

Thus, the government frames a clear dilemma: a peace treaty or the risk of renewed military escalation. Pashinyan has also stated that political forces led by Robert Kocharyan, Samvel Karapetyan, and Gagik Tsarukyan are effectively moving toward revising the peace agenda, which, in his words, opens “the door to war”.

The opposition, in turn, views such rhetoric as pressure on society. Its representatives accuse the government of using fear of war as a tool to legitimize concessions, arguing that this framing replaces substantive discussion of the treaty’s conditions and creates an artificial “peace or war” dichotomy.

Thus, the possibility of a new war becomes not only a security factor but also an instrument of internal political struggle.

Expert Assessments

Pro-Western forces in Armenia generally support the government’s peace agenda.

Political analyst Davit Stepanyan argues against Robert Kocharyan’s position: “In today’s world, there is no guarantor of peace or security”. He questions whether Russia — the guarantor implied by the opposition — can or is willing to fulfill such a role.

Political analyst Davit Stepanyan

Stepanyan does not rule out the possibility of a peace treaty before the elections but considers it unlikely due to regional instability, including the uncertain outcome of the Iranian crisis.

He also agrees with Pashinyan’s argument that the return of pro-Russian forces could increase the risk of escalation, noting that Moscow is not interested in peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as it uses the conflict as a tool of influence.

At the same time, political analyst Hrant Mikaelian offers a different assessment. He believes that any peace agreement would be largely symbolic and would not lead to real stability. In his view, only two scenarios are possible: “no peace, no war” or a renewed war.

Political analyst Hrant Mikaelyan

According to Mikaelian, Azerbaijan’s statements about peace are tactical, aimed at gaining concessions from the West. He argues that Armenia must focus on deterrence policy.

Geopolitics: Rising US Role and Shifting Russian Influence

The preliminary agreement signed in August 2025 under the mediation of Donald Trump marked a significant turning point. The sides agreed on several provisions, including the development of a transport corridor connecting Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan via Armenian territory. This project strengthens the role of the United States while reducing Russia’s influence in the region.

However, the agreement remains a framework document requiring further political settlement. Washington is interested in accelerating the process as a tool for expanding its regional influence, but its leverage over Baku remains limited, especially amid tensions involving Iran.

At the same time, the European Union is increasing its engagement. Armenia is deepening cooperation with the EU, including in security and hybrid threat prevention. However, the EU is not yet perceived as a full security guarantor, and its role remains primarily political and institutional.

International Court Cases: Pressure and Counter-Pressure

When Armenia initiates cases against Azerbaijan in international courts, Baku typically responds with counterclaims. This creates a bilateral legal process in which both sides use judicial mechanisms as tools of pressure and legitimacy.

While such proceedings establish a legal framework and attract international attention, they also reinforce confrontation and mistrust, often complicating rather than accelerating the peace process.

Public Reaction and the Core Question

Even after the 2025 agreement, public opinion in Armenia remains divided between cautious optimism and deep skepticism. The peace process has become not only a diplomatic issue but also a subject of interpretation: for some, it represents opportunity; for others, risk.

The peace treaty has effectively become a tool of electoral competition, a marker of geopolitical orientation, and one of the main drivers of political polarization.

The key question in the coming months is whether the peace treaty will become part of the electoral campaign or be signed after the formation of a new government. The answer will determine whether the South Caucasus moves toward sustainable peace or remains in a state of prolonged uncertainty.

 

Journalist,
Marine Kharatyan

#ARMENIA

01.05.2026 06:45