It is official – Russia’s economy is hitting rock bottom. This was confirmed by none other than Putin himself. The almighty ruler and president of the Russian Federation announced the troubling news during a regular government meeting held right after the Orthodox Easter holidays. Hardly any Russian was shocked or surprised – they were already well aware of that. The constantly increasing household utility expenses they pay every month, the record-high food prices and the overwhelming state control of every aspect of their private lives have already convinced them that the situation is going downhill. And now there is another sure sign of decline – the massed Ukrainian drone attacks which are almost never acknowledged in the official media. Plus the strict internet censorship and blocking maintained by Roskomnadzor, the federal service responsible for the supervision of communications and mass media. Contrary to many predictions, it is the internet blackouts and the ban of nearly all popular social media platforms and messengers, and not the huge number of battle casualties and the dire economic situation, that cause quiet and not so quiet unrest in Russia nowadays. We have yet to see whether the dangerous combination of unbearable censorship and empty wallets will spark a mass revolt in the near future, although for the time being that particular scenario seems very unlikely to me.

The bad news for Russia doesn’t end there. The recent Ukrainian “deep-strike” drone attacks have confirmed what we already know: the Russian air defense, known by its Russian abbreviation PVO, can’t deal with the modern aerial threats. The reason is simple: the territory of Russia, which totals a sixth of the surface of the Еarth, is so vast that there will never be enough air defense systems to cover all probable avenues of approach of the Ukrainian drones. But that’s not all. The core of the problem is that the Russian PVO has been built around a concept that is already dated - it is an inheritor of the Soviet PVO that was designed to deal with NATO aerial superiority (i.e., high-altitude strategic bombers and fast jet fighters) and not with low-flying quiet drones.

There are basically three types of air-defense systems in the present-day Russian army: strategic (long-range), mid-range and tactical (short-range). The former consist of very expensive S-400 missile systems grouped into separate battalions comprised of 8-12 launchers, a mobile command post and 1-2 radars. The total cost of the entire unit is close to a billion USD and a single missile costs in the range of 2 million. The missiles of the mid-range defensive systems are also very expensive (ca. USD 300,000), not to mention that they are gathered in batteries of six machines each. It is only the highly mobile tactical air defense systems that prove themselves capable of dealing with the Ukrainian drone threat. The Soviet-era “Osa” armed with short-range missiles and especially the latest Russian development – the “Pantsir” multi-purpose system, which apart from missiles also has two 30mm anti-aircraft guns – can rapidly be moved from one endangered point to another. “Pantsir” also has its own built-in radar that allows it to track independently any incoming aerial targets. But they are not the remedy for the Ukrainian middle-strike and deep-strike drones simply because there are not enough of them. The production of “Osa” ceased in 1988 and the Russian military industry is capable of manufacturing no more than fifty “Pantsir” systems per year.

What Russian air defense actually needs to fight back the drone threat effectively is a cheap, affordable solution. The production cost of the most widely used Ukrainian deep-strike drone, the FP-2, is about USD 55,000. The logic says that the respective weapon that is supposed to destroy it should not cost more than that. Is there a working solution already in use? Yes, but not in Russia. The Ukrainian Wild Hornets group has developed a cheap drone-intercepting loitering munition officially designated “Sting”, which falls into the USD 2,000 price range. Call it a drone interceptor or a drone killer, but this small toy-looking quadcopter that could be carried by hand is highly effective. It takes up to three “Stings” to down or destroy a Russian “Shahed” drone. The production cost of the latter is at least USD 50,000 and I’m sure that you have already done the right math. No doubt, the drone interceptors may become a game changer for the Russian air defense, but there are no signs on the horizon that anyone within the Kremlin power circles is thinking along that line.

In the meantime, the Ukrainian special forces continue to undermine the Russian economy by delivering precise drone strikes on preselected key facilities. Since the beginning of the year they have been conducting a consistent two-stage campaign against the most important war-related industries, but also against the Russian air defence as a whole. Radars and mobile systems like “Osa”, “Tor” and “Pantsir” are being hunted and destroyed at a rate of 240% higher than the last quarter of last year. The numbers speak for themselves: 21 systems were put out of action in January, 25 in February, the record-breaking 39 in March, and at least 10 by mid-April. March is also a record-breaking month in terms of strikes against Russian industrial objects – a total of 39 of them were hit, including 18 assets of the oil industry, 18 military plants, 2 power stations and 1 military base. The effect of the strikes is varying – while the Baltic ports of Ust Luga and Primorsk, which are key points for Russian oil exports, are already back in operation, the oil refinery in Tuapse is still burning.

The situation on the ground is equally difficult for both sides. There was a Russian infiltration in Sumy Oblast, where many small infantry assault groups advanced on a frontage of at least 40 km. Although at no point deep penetration occurred and only few border-line villages were occupied, the action must serve as a red flag for the Ukrainian command since it is apparent that there is no properly organized defense in that area.

Further south, in the vicinity of Kupiansk, the Ukrainians are still in possession of a relatively large bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Oskil River. They are under constant pressure from the Russians, let alone the latter already have succeeded in destroying all the bridges across the river using mainly KAB guided bombs. Whether the looming logistic crisis will force the defenders to abandon that very valuable outpost is yet to be seen.

The focal point of the so-called Russian spring offensive is still in the vicinity of the Kramatorsk-Sloviansk agglomeration. There is no doubt that it will remain there for the rest of the year. As I already wrote in my previous analyses, the invaders will try to envelop the multi-layered Ukrainian stronghold by attacking simultaneously from three directions: northeast (through Lyman), east and southeast (through Kostiantynivka). So far it is only the attack straight from the east that produces some results and even they are barely visible on the situation maps. The northern pincer (the one trying to push through Lyman) is under danger of being cut off by sharp Ukrainian counterattacks against its flanks, while the southern pincer has been effectively stopped at Kostiantynivka. The latter town, even though almost raised to the ground, is a very hard nut to crack because the Ukrainians have prepared it very carefully for all-around defense. My humble prediction is that Kostiantynivka will be the new Pokrovsk in terms of media attention and headline news. The Russians fire a lot of artillery shells and drop plenty of guided bombs in order to force the defenders out of their positions. They also keep under constant surveillance the main supply routes and strike with drones nearly all vehicles way before they are able to reach the outskirts of the city. The Ukrainians respond with the same tactics, blowing to pieces all military vehicles within their reach and inflicting heavy losses on the attacking enemy infantry.

Speaking of Pokrovsk, it must be noted that even though the city is already firmly in Russian hands, its vicinity is far from quiet. Since the second half of February the Ukrainians have been fighting tooth and nail for two small settlements (or what is left of them) – the village of Hryshyne and the town of Rodynske, situated northwest of Pokrovsk and north of Myrnohrad, respectively. By defending the former the Ukrainian troops prevent the aggressors from advancing up the road to Pavlohrad, while the latter serves as one of the outposts protecting Kostiantynivka from being outflanked from the west.

In Zaporizhzhia Oblast, with its nearly 70 km-long frontline, the situation remains stable and no significant changes occurred on the maps during recent weeks. The Ukrainian troops remain in firm control of two key fortresses – Orikhiv and Stepnohirsk – that allow them to keep the Russians away from the most valuable prize in the southeastern part of the country, the city of Zaporizhzhia.         

There is no doubt that during the upcoming summer the fighting on the front will grow in intensity. There are several reasons for that and the improving weather conditions are only one of them. We should always keep in mind the worsening internal political situation in Russia and the stagnating economy. In a desperate attempt to save his regime, Putin will keep pushing his commanders to herd their troops forward, hoping that even the small territorial gains in Ukraine will somehow divert the public attention from catastrophic thoughts and the darkening future.  

Military expert

Kamen Nevenkin

#RUSSIA

#UKRAINE

26.04.2026 07:00