What Biden’s Team Tells Us About His Russia Policy

A contested election and a failed insurrection later, the Joe Biden presidency is almost upon us.
In November, I wrote in these pages that “all signs point to a Biden administration pursuing a Russia policy that combines cooperation and confrontation,” a conclusion I reached largely on the basis of the president-elect’s record on Russia and Eastern Europe.
Yet personnel is policy — up to a point, anyway. As it happens, we now know who Biden’s major foreign policy and national security appointments are, new information that invites a reassessment of what we expect Biden’s Russia policy to involve.
Most obviously, there is no real opposition to the aforementioned marriage of cooperation and confrontation, although some members of Biden’s team are more skeptical than others.
CIA Director-designate Bill Burns and even Biden’s pick for Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the infamous Victoria Nuland, welcome such a policy, reasoning that the U.S. must “not give up on the longer-term prospect of a healthier relationship with Russia” and should be prepared to “stretch out a hand [of friendship] again” one day, respectively.
For his part, incoming National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan endorses it but harbors doubts about its promise. “Believing that somehow Russia and the United States can … see eye-to-eye on some of the major issues of the day,” he has said, “is only going to end up in disappointment.”
There is consensus, or something approaching it, on several other counts. For one, the team agrees that the Russia threat is an asymmetric one.
Secretary of State-designate Antony Blinken observes that President Vladimir Putin has made “an art form [of] tak[ing] a relatively weak hand … and play[ing] it incredibly well,” while Burns, a former ambassador to Russia, writes that Putin “regularly demonstrates that declining powers can be at least as disruptive as rising powers.”
Many of Biden’s appointees appear to have what two academics call a ‘Wilsonian bias,’ where Russia’s international behavior is largely or entirely attributed to its domestic order.
Commenting on the sources of Russian conduct, Sullivan says that Putin “needs to be understood as having an overriding interest in preserving and extending his own power, first and foremost.”
Meanwhile, Andrea Kendall-Taylor — the National Security Council’s incoming Russia and Central Asia senior director, an intelligence analyst by background, and a comparativist by nature — holds that “Russia underscores the link between rising personalism and aggression.”
Blinken similarly argues that Putin’s Russia entered into conflict with the West because “when Western democracy is successful, it’s the most profound indictment of the system that [Putin has] built in Russia,” adding:
At a certain point, it became against Putin’s personal interest to actually pursue Russian integration [with the West], because he couldn’t accept the rules, the transparency, the norms that come with that. That would undermine the kleptocracy that he was building.
Where several picks stand on the Sino-Russian relationship has gone uncommented on, surprisingly so.
Blinken, Nuland, and Kendall-Taylor all perceive a need or opportunity to divide one country from the other.
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14 Jan 2026


