The war in Ukraine: Russian logistics under fire

    The old military adage — most often attributed to General Robert H. Barrow of the U.S. Marine Corps — holds that "amateurs talk about tactics, but professionals study logistics". Indeed, it is the logistics, and especially the supply problems, that the Russian army is currently experiencing in southeastern Ukraine that occupy the headlines these days. It is a very hot topic, and nearly every respectable international expert begins their analysis with it. Of course, this is not going to be the only theme of my semi-monthly assessment of the Russo-Ukrainian war; I’ll also share my views on the drone strikes, aerial attacks, frontline situation, Zelensky’s open letter to Putin and the prospects for a ceasefire and even for lasting peace.

     

    Ukraine's drone war on Russian logistics

    The Ukrainian approach towards the issue saw a major shift right after New Year’s holidays. It proceeded in stages, one stage at a time, over the span of several months. At first the drone units of the AFU (the Ukrainian Armed Forces) focused their efforts on the railways, given the overall dependence of the Russian army on that kind of transport. Special attention was given to the trains running between Rostov and Crimea, along the Azov Sea coast, since they were carrying fuel, war supplies and materiel. Even though videos of successful drone attacks went viral, this campaign passed largely unnoticed. Then came May. The Ukrainian High Command decided to switch the effort to highways and even the secondary roads, and all of a sudden all hell broke loose for the invaders. Assets like the drone regiment of the 1st “Azov” Corps and the special drone brigade of the famous Robert “Magyar” Brovdi went on hunting missions, striking targets of opportunity. In a matter of a month more than 270 videos and photos of burning or shattered Russian vehicles surfaced online, but perhaps the real number is much higher. The preferred targets were the military cargo trucks (more than 70% of the total number), followed by the heavy-duty fuel tankers (about 10%) and the general-purpose vans. As a result of the repeated strikes, the Russian logistics system in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast is nearly paralysed, and no one in the Kremlin or the High Command has any ideas how to turn the tide. The main problem for the Russians is that the “Azov” regiment employs a special breed of American-made strike drones called “Hornet” that use machine vision and AI to lock onto the target, and for the time being they are impossible to intercept with the available electronic drone jammers. Still worse for the Russians, the distance between Rostov and Crimea is quite long (about 400 km), which makes its protection using traditional methods (mobile machinegun groups on jeeps) an impossible task. But the bad news for the Kremlin doesn’t end here – in the first week of June, Magyar’s “birds” paid attention to the maritime supply routes of the Russian grouping operating in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast and, in one night alone, successfully hit five vessels delivering fuel and supplies to the ports of Berdiansk, Yalta and Mariupol.

    It safely can be said that Crimea is already under blockade, and its only connection to the Russian heartland is the notorious Kerch Bridge, as well as the ferry operating alongside it. There is already a severe fuel shortage in Crimea and widespread panic about the future among the local (mostly pro-Russian) population. There are many scenarios for what Ukrainian leadership is aiming to achieve, and I’ll outline the most reasonable ones: 1) to weaken considerably the 140,000-strong Russian grouping operating on the southern wing of the front and then launch a counteroffensive in the general direction of the lower Dnieper and the Sea of Azov; 2) to make Crimea uninhabitable and force Putin’s supporters to flee the peninsula; 3) to destroy the Kerch Bridge, therefore imposing a full blockade on the entire southern area.

     

    Ukrainian drones pay a visit to Saint Petersburg

    Prior to June 2026, Saint Petersburg, Russia’s cultural capital and the fourth-most populous city in Europe (ca. 5,600,000 inhabitants), remained untouched by the war. This status quo was shattered twice in the early hours of 3 and 6 June, respectively, when hundreds of Ukrainian drones carrying 100- or 200-kg payloads flew into the sky above the city. Even though the Russians claimed to have shot down up to 59 drones on 3 June and another 144 on 6 June, the remainder was enough to inflict significant damage. During the first strike (the one on 3 June) they hit the St Petersburg oil terminal and the Kronstadt naval base. It was in the latter where the modern corvette “Boikiy” (worth USD 400 million) was set afire by a single drone and probably burnt out completely. During the second strike the naval arsenal in Kronstadt received a direct hit and exploded spectacularly. A naval research facility (an institute) was also damaged, and its personnel were forced to evacuate.

    One should keep in mind that these Pearl Harbor-style attacks were not a random choice of Robert “Magyar” and the Ukrainian High Command; they were made on purpose. During that particular period the city hosted one of the most prestigious annual events in the political calendar of Russia, the St Petersburg International Economic Forum. Save for Putin, there were no other high-ranking guests; most of the foreign attendees were mid-level officials, agency representatives, and business executives. On the other hand, among the popular faces spotted there were several “influencers”, whose reputations are questionable at best: Scott Ritter, the Tate brothers, Candace Owens and Steven Seagal. Regardless of their motivations and political beliefs, now all of the guests of what used to be a very prestigious summit have something in common: they have witnessed first-hand how weak the Russian aerial defence really is and how the former nuclear global power is steadily descending into decline.

     

    The Russian strikes

    The double strike on St Petersburg was actually the AFU’s payback for an earlier massed Russian aerial attack delivered on Kiev, Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia and several other smaller settlements. It took place during the night of 1-2 June when 656 drones (mainly Shaheds) and 73 missiles of various types entered the Ukrainian sky from different directions. The Ukrainian aerial defence succeeded in intercepting 602 of the drones (which is a very high score) and 40 of the missiles. The latter number is not that bad either, but a breakdown by type provides some food for thought. While 29 (out of 32) cruise missiles were downed that night, none of the eight Zircon hypersonic cruise missiles and only 11 (out of 33) Iskander-M ballistic missiles were intercepted. This clearly shows that Ukraine continues to be critically short of its most effective interceptors, PAC-2 and PAC-3 Patriot missiles, which are produced predominately in the USA. But the regular delivery of these crucial air defence missiles is constrained not only by the production capacity of the respective manufacturing facilities, but also by the political will and decisions of the White House administration.

    Some insiders suggest that in recent months, due to the crisis in the Middle East, Kyiv has received only a small fraction of what had been agreed, let’s say one twelfth of the total number of promised PAC-2/3. It is not a secret that Zelensky spends a lot of time seeking additional Patriot systems and interceptors for them, although his success in that regard so far is very limited. Strangely enough, the chronic shortage of anti-ballistic missiles may lead to a permanent solution that will solve most of the problems of the AFU air defence once and for all – it was hinted that the Ukrainian-based company “Fire Point” (the well-known manufacturer of FP-1/2 drones and “Flamingo” cruise missiles) is developing a domestic version of PAC-2/3 that may be tested pretty soon. Apart from that, neighbouring Poland is increasingly becoming part of the PAC-3 supply chain (with several facilities producing critical components for the missiles), and there are rumors that in the immediate future a full-scale production line for complete PAC-3 interceptors will be launched in Poland. During his recent visits to Western Europe, Zelensky received guarantees that two of his main supporters within the EU – Italy and France – will increase the delivery of Aster 30 interceptors for the other anti-ballistic systems used by the AFU, the European-made SAMP/T. Otherwise, it is not difficult to predict the pace of the next Russian massed aerial strikes – usually every two weeks. The timing of those barrages actually depends on the production capacity of the Russian military-industrial complex – once sufficient stocks of missiles and long-range drones have been accumulated, the Russians launch them en masse. The massed barrages in question are interspersed with regular, smaller nightly drone harassment attacks, whose main objective is to exhaust the Ukrainian air defence.

     

    Frontline summary

    A glimpse at the situation maps reveals that no major changes occurred on the frontlines in the past fortnight. Even the focal point of the Russian offensive remains the same – it is still centred in the vicinity of Kostiantynivka. The fate of this strategically important town situated in the northern part of Donetsk Oblast is hanging in the balance. So far the Russians, who are attacking it simultaneously from three directions, have achieved some gains. Their biggest success is the infiltration of several small assault groups into the town’s southeastern districts, where they succeeded in securing firm positions in the multi-storey residential buildings. If the Russians succeed in completely securing Kostiantynivka by mid-July, they still will have chances to achieve a deeper penetration into the main Ukrainian defensive belt by the end of this year. If, however, they fail to do that, the whole of 2026 will be considered wasted for them.

    Putin's army is also very active in some other sectors, such as the vicinity of Kupiansk and the eastern approaches to Sloviansk. In those areas, however, the Russian offensive efforts are fruitless and usually lead to nothing but severe losses. Along the southern wing of the front, in Zaporizhzhia, where the AFU maintain strict drone control over the Russian supply lines, the invaders have switched to the defensive almost everywhere. The lack of progress is obvious to everyone, and several independent observers and think tanks suggest that for a second month in a row the Russians are taking less ground than the Ukrainians are liberating. Perhaps it was this positive trend (from a Ukrainian perspective), plus the series of successful deep-strike drone attacks on Russian oil and military infrastructure, that inspired Zelensky to write an open letter to Putin offering direct peace negotiations. Not surprisingly, the Kremlin dictator rejected it right away. Will he be sorry? No one can tell, but for the time being it is apparent that the war will continue unabated.

     

    Military expert

    Kamen NEVENKIN


    #RUSSIA
    #UKRAINE

    09.06.2026 10:23