It is July 2026, probably the hottest month of the year. Heat is making people dreamy, a little bit lazy and carefree. But not in Ukraine, where the war continues unabated. Even though no major changes have occurred on the battlefield, both belligerents are making one bold move after another, hoping to gain advantageous jump-off positions before the arrival of the autumn rains, the mud, the grey sky and the first frosts. Their strategies are obvious and even transparent, and I’ll do my best to explain them below. As with every other major military conflict, this one is also constantly surrounded by rumours, and I’ll try to clarify some of them too.

 

The Ukrainian Strategy

There are three clearly visible lines of effort in Ukrainian strategy:

1. Intensification of drone warfare;
2. increasing the volume of international material, financial and political support that the country receives from its partners;
3. holding the current frontline and not allowing the invaders to occupy more ground.

Speaking of drone warfare, it must be noted that the Ukrainians are gradually expanding their target list, as well as the operational range of their UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles). While at the turn of the year they were aimed predominantly at valuable Russian military objects in the near-front area, now they perform a lot of so-called "deep strikes", hitting oil refineries, fuel bases, power plants, large logistic hubs, oil tankers, freight vessels and so on. The immediate effect of all these actions is manifold: the ongoing gasoline crisis that already has affected the everyday lives of nearly all Russians of working age; the nearly full blockade of Crimea; the hindering of the Russian petroleum exports; and the growing difficulties with the frontline logistics, to name a few.

Special attention should be paid to the recent Ukrainian attacks on three warehouses operated by Wildberries, Russia's largest online marketplace. The media outcry that followed raises the question of how much of the inventory served military logistics versus ordinary retail customers. Maybe not that much, because the goods destroyed by the untamed fire belonged largely to third-party sellers and individual shoppers, not the military supply chain Kyiv described. Zelensky himself presented the strikes in question mostly as retaliatory ones, a response to the repeated Russian attacks on services like Nova Poshta, a private Ukrainian postal and courier company that provides logistics and related services for individuals and businesses. What the Ukrainian president didn’t mention is the long-term effect that the Wildberries disaster will have on the small Russian vendors (so far their losses are estimated at up to $1 billion) and the morale of the population.

Regarding the second line of the Ukrainian war effort – the international assistance and support – it must be noted that in the last month and a half Zelensky and his team achieved a real breakthrough. They not only obtained guarantees that during the next 24 months the Ukrainian military budget will be "injected" with an additional $140 billion but also got promises that critically important munitions like the anti-ballistic missiles for Patriot and SAMP/T systems will be produced by Ukrainian companies for the exclusive needs of the domestic air defence.

No major changes should be expected in the third line of effort, the military strategy. The Ukrainian leadership, and in particular Zelensky and the commander-in-chief of the AFU (Armed Forces of Ukraine), have already several times publicly announced that there are no plans for a major counteroffensive to push the aggressor out of the occupied lands. Instead, the AFU will concentrate their actions on exhausting the Russian enemy through a series of costly positional battles coupled with counterattacks and increasing friendly drone activity.

What remains uncertain is how deeply the conflict between Mykhailo Fedorov, the now-former minister of defence, and the Supreme Commander of the AFU, General Syrskyi, will impact the conduct of the war. Apparently, there was some sort of conflict between them that was ongoing for months but was kept hidden from the public. Fedorov quickly won the hearts of many of his countrymen with his communication skills, openness, innovative bold ideas and visions for how to change the army for the better. His IT skills and personal connections with various important figures in the tech world made him a very different kind of minister. The results of his work surfaced quite quickly:

• the increased number of foreign and domestically produced drones that reached the AFU;
• the blocking of the Starlink internet terminals used by the Russian army;
• the long-term plans to change the conscription system and to make the service of the frontline combatants shorter and more bearable.

Not surprisingly, the moves and the strategy proposed by Fedorov were not liked by the old-school commanders and key figures within the AFU and the Ukrainian leadership. One of them was the 60-year-old Syrskyi. The latter is a very good commander and a very experienced officer, but many of his younger subordinates openly question his methods, approach and style of command. The conflict between the young IT visionary and the old Soviet dinosaur was inevitable, and Zelensky was forced to make a very difficult choice. Eventually, he decided in favour of Syrskyi, and Fedorov resigned. The conflict and the sacking of Fedorov could not be hidden from the public eye, and before long mass protests erupted in many of the Ukrainian cities, including the capital. Tired of war but still full of hope, many Ukrainians insisted on the return of the charismatic young minister and voiced their demands for changes in the army system. Zelensky is a very clever political leader; he is familiar with the qualities and abilities of Fedorov, and there is no doubt that he will find the best use for them. Given the split in the army (the young generation of officers against the old ones), it is quite possible that in the near future he may replace Syrskyi and move him to a prestigious but less influential position. We have yet to see how this saga will end.   

 

The Russian Strategy

No major changes have occurred in the Russian strategy in recent months. On the battlefield the Russian troops keep relying predominately on infiltration tactics, that is to say simultaneous attacks of many small assault groups comprising 2-3 men, which are supported by drones and artillery. Tanks and other armoured vehicles are rarely seen. These small-scale actions usually make some cracks in the defensive lines of the AFU but almost never lead to full-scale breakthroughs. The efforts of the aggressors, in general, are hampered by a permanent shortage of able-bodied men, logistic difficulties and Ukrainian drone superiority.

Given how the battles are unfolding in the most critical sectors, it could safely be concluded that the High Command in Moscow and Putin himself are focused, first and foremost, on taking the remaining 20% of Donetsk Oblast. This is where they will keep throwing their main forces, resources and reserves. No doubt, Kramatorsk and Sloviansk will share the destiny of Kostiantynivka, Avdiivka and many other once-beautiful Ukrainian towns and cities that were razed to the ground by the so-called "liberators". Taking the entire Donbas will give Putin some justification for the enormous losses his army has sustained so far in Ukraine but also will serve as a reason to continue the war.  

The repeated strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure and residential quarters will continue. There is no logic behind the Russian target selection; it is obvious that the targets have been chosen indiscriminately. Apparently, the main objective of all aerial attacks so far is always the same: to bring fear and panic to the deep rear of the AFU, to terrorise the innocent civilians, to make their lives miserable and thus to force the ordinary people to turn against Zelensky, thereby creating chaos and political unrest.

It is easy to predict that the Kremlin propaganda machine will exploit the current economic difficulties, and especially the gasoline crisis, to redirect the anger and frustrations of the ordinary Russians towards Ukraine and the West. Actually, it is already happening. On the other hand, it is obvious that more and more people, especially in the big cities and towns, will ask uncomfortable questions about the politics carried out by Putin’s regime and the direction it is leading the country. This will hardly affect the upcoming parliamentary elections, given the long-standing traditions of manipulating the election results and brutal pressure to vote for the “correct” candidates.

There are three rumours that have taken the world media by storm in the last month or so:

1) Putin will attack some of the NATO countries, especially in the Baltic area;

2) Belarus will join the war in Ukraine, either as a belligerent or as a foothold for attack towards Kyiv;

3) Putin will declare total mobilisation right after the parliamentary elections in September.

The first two seem very unlikely to happen because Russia lacks the military potential to confront NATO directly and because Lukashenko is clever enough to avoid involving his country in a colossal war like the current one. There is still a small chance that Putin, after all, will declare a new mobilisation, but it is an open question whether Russia possesses the necessary resources to equip, train and sustain so many men, let’s say close to one million. Such a radical step will almost certainly ruin the Russian economy, which barely functions due to a severe labor shortage.

 

 

Military expert

Kamen NEVENKIN

#RUSSIA

#UKRAINE

23.07.2026 08:23